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Institutional Pluralism from the
Standpoint of Its Victims:
Calling the Question on

Indiscriminate (In)Tolerance
By Jos6 Gabilondo'

Abstract. Borrowingfrom postmodernity, new Right intellectuals have become adept at plucking
core terms from the liberalregister,strippingaway their history andsocialcontext, and making them
do the conceptual work of backlash. A recent example is the theme of the 2009 annualmeeting of the
AALS: institutional pluralism. The phrase has a surface resemblance to traditionalliberal values
but, in truth, acts as a Trojan horsefor discriminationprojects that many may find troubling. By
putting the phrasein its socialcontext, this essay reveals the ideologicalinterests at work in the idea.

Keywords: backlash, heterosexuality, institutionalpluralism, religiously affiliated law schools,
sexual minorities, thum6s

Rabinow's essay describes his role as an anthropologist on an interdisciplinary research project-SynBERC--examining synthetic biology, an emerging scientific discipline that examines "the intentional design of artificial
biological systems."2 An anthropologist, Rabinow works on the part of the
project-the Human Practices initiative-that examines the ethical and social dimensions of synthetic biology.3 One of the working premises of Human
Practices is that conceptual "equipment platforms" can be designed and that
an important function of such equipment is to give shape to human affect. 4
He distinguishes himself from what he calls "the social suffering mode of
anthropology."' Nevertheless, he admits that the scientific subgroup to which
he belongs on the SynBERC project belongs to a "dominated position." 6
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He concludes his essay with an example of how the social scientists in Human Practices are dominated by the natural scientists.7 This is ironic because
his account becomes a form of human practice itself as it leads him to reflect
on the wider implications of the unequal power relations between the social
and natural scientists. This reflection turns on a type of affect that bears directly on many of the interests protected by law: thumds. Translated roughly
as "indignation," it is a Hellenistic concept that refers to self-protective reactions in response to attacks on one's self-regard.8 In the common image of the
day, logos (knowledge) was the charioteer reining in and directing eros (physical arousal toward others) and thumds (moral regard for oneself).
Rabinow feels thumds because he suspects that some scientists on the SynBERC project are treated differently from others.9 He wonders:
I pose the question of what affect is appropriate in such a situation [of being
dominated]? Surely anger, or more accurately the Greek thum6s is a plausible
candidate. Why so? Thumds is the capacity of the soul to manifest anger and
zeal. Thums is closely connected to the value one sets on oneself as well as
the manner in which others respond to that self-esteem. These conditions lead
directly to considerations of justice, politics, and ethics. 0
The feeling of indignation triggers invocation of a wider realm of moral
concern about justice and the dignity of others. This essay attempts to do
the same. The triggering indignation was my response to the 2009 annual
meeting theme of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS)-institutionalpluralism.On its face, the theme seems harmless enough. When read
in a social and historical context, though, a more troubling aspect of institutional pluralism emerges: it provides a disguise for retrograde values in the
legal academy. The one I mean is the institutional arrangements that make
heterosexual dominance seem legitimate.
I start by showing how conservative and ultraconservative intellectualslearning from postmodernists-have managed to reappropriate the language
and forms of the liberal register, all the while disemboweling its underlying
values. One of the chief ways of doing this is by stripping ideas and institutions of their historical and social context. As an example of this strategy, I
examine the 2oo9 AALS meeting theme of institutional pluralism. Stripped
of context, it is an innocent-sounding phrase. Returned to its social context,
though, it forms part of a history of how the religiously affiliated law schools
came to be constituted as a special interest group as backlash to the efforts of
388

Gabilondo

*

Institutional

Pluralism from the Standpoint of Its Victims

the ABA and the AALS to protect sexual minority students, staff, and faculty
from discrimination in the legal academy. Reading in context, through rather
than in spite of this social history, leads to a disturbing question about the
liberal register: is it too mealy to stand up to certain social wrongs, in this
case discrimination against gays, lesbians, and other sexual minorities? That
is what I mean about "calling the question." I conclude by suggesting that
schism is a better model for this question than is institutional pluralism.

THE ENABLING RHETORIC OF
POSTMODERN REACTIONARIES
The AALS 2009 meeting theme must be seen as part of the conservative and
reactionary ideology that has insinuated itself into the political and academic
imagination using liberal forms as cover. Sidney Blumenthal tells the beginning of the story in his account of the early Republican mobilization, The Rise
ofthe Counter-Establishment:The Conservative Ascent to Power." He traces the
movement from an ultraright backlash against the New Deal that would not
begin to mature until Richard Nixon's 1968 election as President. Blumenthal continues the story through the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and the
Bushes, but it stops short of the most recent culture wars against the academy.
This war includes David Horowitz's Academic Bill of Rights, the American
Council of Trustees and Alumnae, and the movement for "conservative" diversity promoted by these forces as an antidote to rampant liberalism on U.S.
campuses. It is the humanities and social science departments at universities
that have borne the brunt of reactionary and conservative backlash, but its
influence has been felt in the legal academy too. Here its most visible examples
include the Christian Legal Society's litigation campaign against the nondiscrimination policies (especially of public law schools) and the spectacular
successes of the Federalist Society, with chapters in law schools and national
placement networks that have seeded the federal judiciary.
In this most current chapter of the new Right's efforts, it has learned to
project the social anxiety of religious conservatives and social reactionaries when faced with the substantive openness of the university by displacing and restating that anxiety in the familiar liberal and progressive terms
of "discrimination." Stanley Fish said as much in a i995 editorial in the New
York Times: "Liberals and progressives have been slow to realize that their
389
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preferred vocabulary has been hijacked and that when they respond to oncehallowed phrases [and words like 'discrimination'] they are responding to a
ghost now animated by a new machine."'" This is so because backlash needed
a conceptual interface with the liberal institutions that were its natural targets.
In effect, the Right has gone postmodern by deconstructing offending liberal
categories such that they no longer have any political valence or rhetorical
impact. 3 Much as gay activists reappropriated "queer" and "fag" into badges
of identity, the Right has digested the epithets most offensive to it, words like
"diversity," "difference," and "pluralism."' 4
Not all sectors of the reactionary and conservative mobilization are equal,
though. The claims of strong religion enjoy a special status. One powerful
expression of this special status is the way that discrimination against sexual
minorities in the name of God has been restated as a celebration of religious
liberty. In the new discrimination, the religiously justified straight supremacist
accuses liberals of precisely the very bad act (discrimination) that the conservative seeks to be authorized to do. It is a gutsy move on the part of conservatives and reactionaries, one that has left real liberals conceptually defenseless, especially if they go along with the strategic decontextualization that is
the hallmark of so much of backlash logic and rhetoric. Indeed, as Fish has
pointed out, it is precisely by stripping words and values from their historical
context that the Right has succeeded in co-opting the liberal register of forms
and values." Because arguments based on religious liberty enjoy this special
status in our legal system, the proponents of religious liberty can act on behalf
of other reactionary constituencies as proxy combatants, hacking through
civil society and clearing a path for reactionary movements not linked to religions. Decontextualizing has let the Right shoehorn itself into what had previously been a more liberal mainstream, including the 2009 AALS meeting.
As I explain below, "institutional pluralism" is another of these Trojan horses
that masks radically anti-plural projects as ideologically defensible positions
worthy of tolerance and, indeed, furthering diversity. The appendix to this
Essay reproduces the text of the meeting theme. 6

ORWELL AT THE AALS
Like all good high ideology, the statement uses ennobling language to articulate its conception of legal education and the AALS's role. The AALS is
390
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made up of "self-governing intellectual communities"; the goal is a "healthy
intellectual life" that supports students; the good values here are "institutional
variety" and "distinctive identities"; and the wicked values are "uniformity"
and "conformity." The reader must move from text to context-defeating
the Right's reading instructions-to appreciate the rhetorical work done
by the concept. First, institutional pluralism's bedfellows make an odd (polygamous?) quartet. As an umbrella concept, institutional pluralism is said to
bring together four major types of law schools: state schools, religiously affiliated law schools, historically black schools, and schools with methodological commitments. It is troubling to suggest that a single institution may not
be institutionally pluralist enough within its walls such that difference counts
only when it is inflected at the level of institutional form; but appreciating how
the statement on institutional pluralism works as an occlusive, strategic tool of
ideology involves more than this.
Second, the overall goal of the statement is to undermine the legitimacy
of the AALS by situating it in a field of forces and institutions that-in the
aggregate--diminish the stature of the AALS as legal education's chief regulator. (This is a classic right-wing move.) Of course, market dynamics are one
check on the function and value of the AALS. Running through the statement
is a neoliberal assumption that celebrates a market framing for legal education.
Institutional pluralism is likened to the virtues of consumer choice, a poignant
comparison for formerly publicly supported universities that realize that they
are now only "publicly assisted" or for educators who refuse to see students as
clients. Even in this framing, though, the market is not all good as it is part of a
combination of forces-"powerful market and regulatory norms"-that run
the risk of undermining the localized freedom to create. Ironically enough for
a statement issued by the AALS, the unwelcome regulator that is holding back
all of this institutional richness is, of course, the AALS itself and, more specifically, its accreditation standards (about which I say more later). The statement
also seems to reject-or at least to question-the value of ordinal fixations
caused by the U.S. News and World Report system. That would seem to be a
good thing, of interest to the vast majority of law schools that find themselves
holding up the bottom of the pyramid.
I see several valid objections to this reading of institutional pluralism. First,
not all religious schools promote discrimination. Indeed, many of them go
out of their way to be inclusive of sexual minorities. Second, the question of
whether to give effect to religiously based rejection of sexual minorities is
391
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only one of the points of divergence between some of the religiously affiliated
schools and the secularizing expectations of accrediting agencies. Granted,
rising tolerance for sexual minorities is only one form of secular provocation for some religiously affiliated schools, but it is an important one that is
likely to intensify with time. Taken as a whole, though, the statement on institutional pluralism works a highly stylized interest convergence, combining enough surface elements of liberalism with latent reactionary elements
to be acceptable to a still liberal institution like the AALS that-when push
comes to shove-will look no deeper than the surface forms. To do otherwise would be to use methods more critical than typically associated with the
AALS. Though appealing on the surface, this move needs to be seen as part of
an overall attack on the presumptuousness of a secularizing national authority like the AALS to dictate governance norms that may conflict with those at
religiously affiliated schools.
For those who do like deep or critical analysis, though, what is really going on here is that the religiously affiliated schools and their natural (rather
than pluralist) allies have found a new shell. Consider the extent to which the
three signature panels emphasized the interests of the religiously affiliated law
schools.' " All three of the panels had explored related facets of the religiously
affiliated law schools or their fellow travelers: one of the three presidential
sessions was devoted entirely to the interests of the religiously affiliated law
schools; the panel on institutional pluralism discussed religion at length; and
the panel on associational pluralism involved separate organizations that are
complementary to the religiously affiliated law schools.

GODLY SCHOOLS AND THE GAYS:
RENOUNCING THE OTHER (AND VICE VERSA)
If the religiously affiliated schools are using institutional pluralism as a shield
to promote sectarian ends, it should come as no surprise since they have
been in cahoots to resist the profession's antidiscrimination norms for nearly
t wo decades, beginning when the American Bar Association (ABA) and the
AALS decided to extend these norms to include gays and lesbians in the legal
academy. Of course, most people are heterosexuals but many of them make
the unjustified leap of reaching moral and normative conclusions from their
object choice preferences.
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This history starts in 199o, when the AALS House of Representatives
voted unanimously to amend its Bylaw 6-4 to add "sexual orientation" to the
list of protected categories under the Association's nondiscrimination provisions. 8 Many religiously affiliated schools objected and, to appease them,
the AALS Executive Committee adopted an Interpretive Principle in August
1993 letting these schools take into account a prospective faculty member's
religious orientation in promotion and tenure.' 9 A parallel process of accommodation to employment discrimination against sexual minority faculty in the
name of God took place when the ABA decided to include sexual orientation
as a prohibited basis of discrimination in law schools. This it did in 1992, when
its Standards Review Committee added "sexual orientation" to the list of categories in Standard 211 of prohibited discrimination. Following (and no doubt
avoiding) suit, the ABA, at the same time, introduced a religious exception to
Standard 211 preventing the religiously affiliated law schools from falling into
noncompliance with the standard on antidiscrimination.
These processes helped galvanize the religiously affiliated law schools into
collective action around efforts to resist aspects of the ABA accreditation standards and the AALS membership standards deemed inimical to sectarian missions. In 1994, the first conference of the Association of Religiously Affiliated
Law Schools took place in Milwaukee.' The second conference took place
at Regent University in 1998.21 Most recently, in a conference at Baylor Law
School in April 2oo6, twenty-eight religiously affiliated law schools agreed
unanimously to form a sponsoring organization known at first as the Association of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools.' Part of what animates this collective action is figuring out how to implement religious visions about sexual orientation whose secular expression faces rising scrutiny. For example, Kristin
Gerdy's 2006 article in the Oregon Law Review argued that religiously affiliated law schools have a First Amendment associational right to bar employment to "practicing" homosexuals.- Not all religiously affiliated law schools
openly discriminate against sexual minorities but the most egregious examples
in the legal academy of this type of discrimination have occurred only at religious law schools. Gay and lesbian law students at Georgetown Law School
had to sue in court under the District of Columbia's human rights ordinance
in order to compel the school to recognize the law school's gay and lesbian
student group.24 Despite organized action on the part of students and faculty
at Notre Dame, the school still refuses to permit the formation of a gay and
lesbian student group.25 As recently as 2007, Notre Dame refused to welcome
393
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on campus the Soulforce Equality Ride, a nationwide mission of youth leaders
who address religion-based discrimination against sexual minorities."
Again, as noted earlier, religiously based hostility to rising tolerance in the
secular world for sexual minorities was only one of the triggers that led the
religiously affiliated law schools to circle the wagons; but this provocation
did seem to trigger a chain reaction whose effects continue to reverberate,
even into the structure of the AALS annual meeting. So it does seem that the
antidiscrimination efforts of the ABA and the AALS moved the religiously
affiliated law schools (that might otherwise compete for religious students) to
join forces. That should come as no surprise because a fundamental value was
at stake for both sides. (Indeed, anti-gay animus seems to be one of the few
transcendent elements that can bring together the different sects.27 ) Moreover,
the decisions of the ABA and the AALS to codify antidiscrimination norms
to protect sexual minorities similarly led the religiously affiliated schools to
codify their own opposition to these norms, much as the possibility of gay
marriage has led the most ardent proponents of normative heterosexuality to
textualize their opposition to antidiscrimination norms by enacting Defense
of Marriage initiatives and the like. Granted, not all religions or even religious fundamentalists endorse normative heterosexuality. Many religiously
affiliated law schools treat gay and lesbian student groups splendidly, Seattle
University Law School being a prominent example. The heterogeneity of
positions of sexual minorities at Catholic and other religiously affiliated institutions does not rebut my basic claim, though, that religious freedom lets
some law schools openly discriminate against sexual minorities in the name of
God and that, relatedly, the only support for anti-gay animus that continues
to get any real traction in the United States is when it is offered in the name
of God.'
The San Diego annual meeting was an especially poignant background for
this issue because a state referendum-Proposition 8-had just revived the
legal disability on homosexuals with respect to civil marriage. Some panels
addressed legal aspects of Proposition 8, but they did not seem to explore
institutional pluralism's relationship to Proposition 8. This is too bad because
institutional pluralism and Proposition 8 are two peas in a pod. For example,
the moderator of the signature panel on institutional pluralism, Pepperdine
Dean Kenneth Starr, leads the effort to have the California Supreme Court
strip the existing marriage rights of those gays and lesbians who married before Proposition 8 was passed.
394
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Liberal institutions may not exclude applicants who reject the values of
antidiscrimination but religiously affiliated schools may do just this by preferring to hire those in tune with their school's religious mission, an employment
practice permitted both by law and the accreditation standards of the ABA
and the AALS. This kind of variety involves a Gresham's law about the
reproduction (and subsidy) of minority religious fundamentalist views. The
most overt forms of anti-gay violence continue, in the sense that being physically victimized and, in the most extreme case, threatened with death, continues to be the case for many sexual minorities. But marginal improvements in
social conditions for some sexual minorities have activated a backlash, including formulations-like institutional pluralism-with a surface similarity to
liberal values.

SCHISM AS REDEMPTION
Returning to Rabinow-what is needed is a better framework for animating
sexual minority thumds. No mere dyspepsia, thumds is a practice of self-cultivation to deal with a threatening world by giving an account of it that rehabilitates one's sense of injured dignity. This project should not be confused
with neurosis, which situates the problem inside the person rather than in an
illegitimate social condition. Neurosis also privatizes the harm by framing
relief in individual terms.29 In contrast, the direction in thumds starts with the
legitimacy of the injury and moves outward against the injuring world. The
goal is to revive the expectation by directing one's hostility outward against
the aggressor. This can provide a public framework for remediating collective harms. So thumds is more socially constructive than the superficially related idea of ressentiment. ° Indeed, thum6s is one of the few ways keep one's
wits while in a dominated present. This became clear to many after Proposition 8, when several demonstrations took place against the Mormon Church
because of its pivotal role in enabling the initiative.31 For the demonstrators,
Proposition 8 may have clarified where they actually stand in heterosexual
society.
So institutional pluralism may mask differences that are so constitutive that
they should be framed more overtly (and honestly) as schism. Schism lets institutions take sides in a social controversy and bear costs from doing so, that
way helping-or hindering-social justice. Schism avoids the smarminess
395
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that Stanley Fish criticizes when he writes that "neutrality" is often a front for
immoral behavior:
Those who stand on neutral principles often wish to be neutral in the political
sense, and they avoid taking sides in deference to the pluralism of the forces in
the field. It is for them that Machiavelli reserves his greatest scorn: "As a general
thing, anyone who is not your friend will advise neutrality, while anyone who
is your friend will ask you to join him, weapon in hand." Taking sides, weapon
in hand, is not a sign of zealotry or base partisanship; it is the sign of morality;
and it is the morality of taking sides."
Calling the question on normative heterosexuality invites persons and institutions to take a stand. Because one's reputation is at stake in this position, it
is also a wager, one that proponents of normative heterosexuality fear losing.
In the short run, draping religiously framed overinvestment in heterosexuality in the language of institutional pluralism gives these views cover in a social
world that, increasingly, sees such views as it sees blacksmiths, an artifact that
had a function only in a past long overtaken by technological and social developments.33 Eventually, a new consensus will emerge (history may absolve us,
but who wants to wait?) that relates back to the morality of this moment and
that will lead to proper adjustments to reputation. In the meantime, maintaining one's own moral clarity in the present-regardless of the lags in other
persons and institutions-is a way to manage one's own force impact, channeling it as much as one can by conforming one's speech, conduct, and being
to one's own sense of moral certainty, although it may be contested in social
space.
We would no longer entertain arguments about institutional pluralism when
it came to whether racial discrimination is legitimate because a normative determination is already in place that such arguments are unacceptable. We have
reached no such normative determination when it comes to anti-gay discrimination, so we can entertain pluralist defenses of normative heterosexuality.
And this is not to say that normative heterosexuality is anywhere near losing
effective, ongoing control over social institutions such as courts, schools, and
government. Its coup de grace is still far away. What is happening, though, is
that, for the first time in such a serious and persistent way, a reasoned challenge
is being mounted to the traditional order of normative heterosexuality. Just
this trend is alarming enough to those who would have hoped for generations
more of unquestioned and, in effect, invisible normative heterosexuality.
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So these trends are calling the question. And it leads to another set of questions about professional relations between sexual minorities and others: where
does the liberal situate himself in this conflict? How ought the sexual minority
academic and her allies think about heterosexual acquiescence with straight
supremacy? We lack the kind of moral clarity that develops after a morally
contested issue has been resolved. The direct stakeholders of this conflict are
sexual minorities and those committed to normative heterosexuality, but the
conflict also reveals another conflict of liberalism, in the sense used by Stanley Fish. If liberals cannot see their way to some degree of substantive commitment to equality-in this case for sexual minorities-they should rethink
whether they are really liberals.

Association of American Law Schools 2009
Statement on Institutional Pluralism

The AALS is an association of self-governing intellectual communities. Member schools are expected to adhere to our core values of teaching, scholarship,
academic freedom, and diversity. But within the wide space bounded by those
values our members are very different kinds of institutions. There are 72 state
schools that play special roles in the legal communities of their sponsoring
states. There are 49 religiously affiliated law schools whose missions are defined or influenced by particular faiths. There are law schools at historically
black colleges and universities that have their own special commitments; and
schools whose intellectual efforts are governed by a particular point of view
(like law and economics) or directed at a particular subject matter (environmental law, or intellectual property). This year's theme focuses on the value
of our institutional differences.
Institutional pluralism is a good thing for our students in the same way
choices are good for consumers in other fields. It may also contribute in an
important way to a healthy intellectual life. Progress in the life of the mind is
a cultural achievement. A community of scholars working on the same problem, or in the same idiom, may accomplish things a group of disconnected individuals could not. (Think of the Manhattan Project, or fin de si~cle Vienna.)
The Association should cherish the interests of its members in pursuing these
ends.

Law & Literature - Volume 21. Number 3

At the same time there are powerful market and regulatory norms that push
law schools toward uniformity. The ABA accreditation process uses one set
of standards that it asks all institutions to conform to. The U.S. News ranking

system uses another linear measure. Law firms who hire our graduates rely on
simple tools like rankings as an index of quality. These forces may impede, or
even frustrate, schools' efforts to cultivate their own distinctive identities.
The AALS might also want to reflect on the issue of institutional variety
in its own affairs. We now see, around AALS annual meetings, a number of

parallel organizations concerned with particular points of view. The Federalist Society and the Society of American Law Teachers are just two examples.
Should the Association (like some of its members) cultivate a particular set
of interests or values, and leave it to other organizations to develop opposing
points of view? Or is the proper analogy something more like Congress-a

single body comprising different members but representing all possible
approaches?

j. My grateful thanks go to Penelope Pether for her ongoing support for this type of work and to Charles
Pouncy and Jorge Esquirol for their comments on earlier drafts. My tide paraphrases Edward Said's
"Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims," I Social Text 7 (Winter 1979).
z. Paul Rabinow, "Prosperity, Amelioration, Flourishing: From a Logic of Practical Judgment to Reconstruction," 21Law &Literature
301, 302 (2009).
3. Id. at 311-14.
4. "The forging of affect is a component in the construction of contemporary equipment." Rabinow,
supra note 2, at 319. "Equipment is a technical term referring to a practice situated between the traditional terms of method and technology." Id. at 306. See also id. at 3o7-o8. A platform helps to generate
solutions to a variety of problems. "An equipmental platform can be distinguished from equipmental
activities and from specific instances of equipment." Id.at 308.
1. Id. at 317
6. Id. at 315.
7.Id.at37-i8.
8. Id.at319.
9. Id.at318.
to. Id.
ii. Sidney Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment: The Conservative Ascent to Political Power
(New York: Union Square Press, 1986).
12. Reproduced in Stanley Fish, The Trouble with Principle
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999),

309-1 2.
13. Fish points out how much the same was accomplished by Michael McConnell in successfully chal-

lenging the University of Virginia's refusal to fund a religious student paper as a form of viewpoint
discrimination. One could object that "[i]f viewpoint discrimination is to be an incisive category, there
must be some forms of regulation that do not fall within. As cogent as it is, however, the objection is
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unlikely to make McConnell pause because all it does is name his strategy. He wants the category of
viewpoint discrimination to lose its edge and become so capacious that nothing falls outside it. If he
succeeds in making everything viewpoint discrimination, his clients will be successful in their course
of action; and to that end he is willing to employ a form of analysis (practiced by poststructuralists and
postmodernists) he may personally deplore, the corrosive interrogation of anything and everything."
Fish, supra note 12, at 226.
14. The new Right has developed several generative assumptions as the building blocks for its arguments

in favor of more religion in public life. See Jos6 Gabilondo, "When God Hates: How Liberal Guilt Lets
the New Right Get Away with Murder," 44 Wake ForestL. Rev. iot (2oo9) (analyzing and countering
reactionary rhetorical moves in favor of more religion in university life).
15. Fish explains how and why it works: "Well, first of all, by sleight of hand. The eye is deflected away
from the whole history, culture, habitats, society-and the parts, now freed from any stabilizing context, can be described in any way one likes. But why is the sleight of hand successful? Why don't more
people see through it? Because it is performed with the vocabulary of America's civic religion the
vocabulary of equal opportunity, color-blindness, race neutrality, and, above all, individual rights. This
was also the vocabulary of civil rights activists, anti-McCarthyites, and liberals in general, many of
whom are now puzzled and even defensive when they hear their own words coming out of the mouths
of their traditional opponents." Fish, supra note 12, at 312.
j6. Association of American Law Schools, Program, 2oo9 Annual Meeting (San Diego, Cal., Jan. 6 so,
2009).

r7. The annual meeting featured three signature panels on Thursday, January 8. The panel on Institutional Pluralism was moderated by Kenneth Starr. The other panelists were Heather Gerken (Yale Law
School), R. K. Greenawalt (Columbia University School of Law), Sanford Levinson (University of
Texas School of Law), and Daniel Polsby (George Mason University School of Law). Two other panels ran concurrently. One on Religiously Affiliated Law Schools was moderated by Patricia O'Hara,
Dean of Notre Dame Law School. The other panelists included James Gordon (Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark Law School), Michael Herz (Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law),
Mark Sargent (Villanova University School of Law), and Bradley Toben (Baylor University School
of Law). The panel on Associational Pluralism was moderated by Gail Heriot (San Diego School of
Law). The other panelists were Margaret Martin Barry (Catholic University of America School of
Law), Michael Briotnall (American Political Science Association), Goodwin Liu (Berkeley School of
Law), and John McGinnis (Northwestern University School of Law).
18. Interpretive Principle to Guide Religiously Affiliated Member Schools as They Implement By-Laws
§ 6.3(a) and Executive Committee Regulation 6-3.1.
19. Id.

2o. The conference proceedings were published in 78 Marquette Law Review 247. (There was no official
title for the proceedings.)
21. See i Regent UniversityLaw Review 1(1998-99). The third took place in Queens, New York, in 2000.
See 74 St.John'sLaw Review 565 (2000).

22. See the announcement of the group's formation at Baylor University, "New Association Will Link
Religiously Affiliated Law Schools," April 3, 2oo6, hrtp://www.baylor.edu/pr/news.php?action=
story&story=40002 (last accessed on June 15, 2009).
23. Kristin Gerdy, "The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object: When Antidiscrimination Standards and Religious Belief Collide in ABA-Accredited Law Schools," 85 Oregon Law Review 943, 984
("Forcing a religiously affiliated law school with opposing doctrinal views to employ practicing homosexuals and others who are unwilling to abide by its moral conduct code would significantly burden its
ability to model the values it seeks to express."). See also id. at 982 87 (2oo6).
24. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d i
(D.C. 1987).
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In 1995, an ad hoc committee of staff, faculty, and administrators requested that the school allow its
students and faculty to form an on-campus group. Notre Dame still refuses to do so. See Notre Dame
response, Core Council for Gay and Lesbian Students at http://corecouncil.nd.edu/nd-response/
index.shtml (last accessed on June i, 2009).
26. See Soulforce Press Release, available at http://www.soulforce.org/article/i194 (referencing a
Princeton Review survey listing Notre Dame as one of the least gay-friendly schools in the country)
(last accessed on June 15,2009).
27. It was such an alliance between fundamentalist Christian, Jewish, and Muslim groups in Jerusalem
that succeeded in blocking a gay rights rally there in 20o6. In this context, anti-gay animus creates
a unity of purpose within the Abrahamic traditions, as noted about the Jerusalem coalition: "Jerusalem's lesbian and gay community has unintentionally succeeded in doing something that has eluded the
world's greatest thinkers: unite many members of the three major monotheistic religions. Orthodox
Jews, conservative Muslims, and prominent Christian leaders are united in their opposition to a gay
pride march in Jerusalem, a city that's holy toall three religions. The pope called for today's march to
be canceled. Muslim leaders called it a disgrace. Orthodox Jews organized weeks of violent demonstrations." Dion Nissenbaum, "Gay Pride Parade is Now a Rally," Miami Herald,Nov. Io, zoo6, at 2oA.
Security concerns about the march led to its cancellation, pleasing some who would have preferred a
more complete form of conceptual liquidation. As one Israeli Deputy Prime Minister in the governing coalition noted: "If it was up to me, I would send the gay community, who insisted on celebrating
in Jerusalem, to Sodom and Gomorrah..." Greg Myre, "Under Heavy Police Guard, Gay Rights
Advocates Rally in Jerusalem," New York Times, Nov. II,2oo6, at Az3 (quoting deputy prime minister
Eli Yishai of the Shas party).
28. In a passage suggesting that religious power receded after the Enlightenment, Fish notes how gay
marriage has helped to reactivate religious factors in society: When John Milton and others debated
divorce in the seventeenth century, their proof texts were scriptural even though what was at stake was
a change in the civil law. The example shows not only that the prestige and scope of a vocabulary is
a function of historical change rather than an indication of a natural epistemological divide but that
changes in history can be reversed. Now that gay marriage is a possibility (or a specter) on the public
scene, theological considerations are once again being urged in the public sphere and I have recently
heard radio talk-show conversations that might well have occurred in the 164os. Fish, supra note 12,
at217.
29. This process should not be confused with sublimation, in which the essential antagonism and injury are
buried so as to achieve a smoothness of psychic purpose. Sublimation leads to making one's peace with
the irritant. Thumds suggests a permanent structure of oppositional awareness. The two are palpably
different.
30. Popularized by Friedrich Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morals (1887) and elaborated on by his
student Max Scheler in Ressentiment (1912), ressentiment, like thumds, involves an injury to self-regard
that is blamed on another and that gives rise to a moralized frame of one's situation. Ressentiment,
however, frames libidinal rage as a neurotic response that is unjustified. As Scheler puts it:
25.

Ressentiment is an incurable, persistent feeling of hating and despising which occurs in certain
individuals and groups. It takes its root in equally incurable impotencies or weaknesses that
those subjects constantly suffer from. The feeling of resentiment leads to false moral judgments
made on other people who are devoid of this feeling. Such judgments are not infrequently
accompanied by rash, at times fanatical claims of truth generated by the impotency this feeling
comes from.
Scheler, Ressentiment S.
Richard Weisberg suggests much the same: "In its frequent appearance among literary characters, ressentiment reveals its literal meaning, 'resensing.' The ressentient man lives through, again and
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again, the event that proves his passivity, resenses and intellectualizes it to the point of creating a false
ethic from it." Richard H. Weisberg, The Failure of the Word: The Protagonistas Lawyer in Modern
Fiction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984) , 20 (analyzing the symbolic function of lawyers in
eight modern works of fiction).
31. Placards said things like "No more Mrs. Nice Gay" and "Fight back! Remove the tax exemption from

the Church of the Latter Day Saints Now!"
32. Fish, supra note 12, at 14 (citation omitted).

33. Straight talk about the religiously affiliated law schools is complicated by many factors. Personal factors like friendship and careerist investment have impacts on how the debate is framed in the legal
academy. Many sexual minority academics and their allies serve or have served on religiously affiliated
faculties. And friendships in the academy span differences of identity, generation, and values. Insofar
as we have blended our professional destinies with religious schools, we may have a careerist interest
in defending religiously affiliated schools.

401

